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Annual Report “Graphicity” and Stock Returns  
 
Abstract 
Prior literature finds information content in the text of 10-K filings. Using a large hand collected 
dataset, we provide the novel evidence on the additional information embedded in the designs 
and graphs of financial reports. We find that firms with lower accruals, larger size, and higher 
Fog index tend to add graphic information to the standard financial reports in addition to SEC 
standard 10-Ks. Interestingly, we find that firms who added graphic financial reports experienced 
a positive 2.7% abnormal returns after the graphic financial reports is released for 3 to 6 months. 
The finding remains robust after controlling for financial market constraints, investor 
sophistication, and information asymmetry. Further tests suggest that the new graphic 
information is additional soft information that the companies try to deliver, rather than 
“hardening” the existing numbers in the 10-Ks. This result suggests that corporate insiders try to 
employ better designed financial reports to deliver important soft information about their 
fundamentals, and it is still a challenge for the market to integrate the additional information in 
the graphic financial reports to stock prices timely and accurately.  
 
Keywords: Graphic Financial Reports, Reporting Format Change, Soft Information, Anomaly 
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1. Introduction 
In the digital age, investors may get easier and faster access to financial information through 
internet based information terminals such as Bloomberg and Morningstar and websites such as 
Google and Yahoo, or Edgar at SEC. However, considering that over half of the public firms are 
still making print based financial reports,1 we may wonder why public firms are still “wasting” 
money on those fancy looking financial reports in addition to the standard financial filings 
required by SEC. After all, CEOs and CFOs are personal liable for any numbers provided in 10-
Ks after the implement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). However, CEOs and CFOs 
have much more freedom to draft and design the print version annual reports. It is very likely 
they could signal investors through “soft” information. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
study about the extra information provided in the print annual reports in addition to the standard 
10-K data, for example, the designs, the messages from managers, and graphs used in the print 
version annual reports. In this paper, we hand collect the information of 10-Ks and annual reports 
of 758 firms and study the pricing effect of graphic information embedded in the firms’ annual 
reports, and we find that firms experience intermediate-term positive abnormal returns after they 
add graphic print version annual report to the standard 10-Ks.   
Ever since Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), researchers have studied extensively information 
economics and investors trading behavior (See Karpoff (1986); Holthausen and Verrecchia 
(1990); Kim and Verrecchia (1997); Verrecchia (2001)). More recently, a growing body of 
finance and accounting literature uses content analysis to examine the clarity, the tone and the 
sentiment of the firms’ annual reports/10-K (e.g. Li (2008), Tetlock (2007), Loughran and 
McDonald (2011, 2013, 2015), Engelberg & Parsons (2011) and etc.). These studies using 
                                                             
1 Based on our hand collected data, there are 478 firms from SP1500 index still releasing print version annual 
reports from year 2008 to 2012. And only less than 300 firms stopped using the print version annual reports. 
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content analysis have found evidence that the firms’ annual reports/10-Ks’ text contains extra 
information about the firms’ future performances. However, most of these studies only focus on 
the text of the financial reports rather than any other components of financial media such as the 
design of the reports or the graphs in the documents (i.e. Ventola & Guijarro, 2009). In this paper, 
we focus on the question as to whether the design and the multimedia elements of the firms’ 
annual reports can deliver any additional information to investors.   
Multimedia as an information communication tool has seldom studied in finance literature. 
To our knowledge, the only related study in mainstream finance research is Goeij et al. (2015).2 
Mainstream finance research literature has explored the Arabic numbers reported in the annual or 
quarterly financial reports, and more recently has studied the textual readability and sentiment in 
the text used in the financial reports. We try to fill in the gap by examining the additional 
information buried under the design and graphs used in financial reports.  
In our paper, we examine the information content of the graphic version of firms’ annual 
reports/10-Ks. We conjecture that managers will employ carefully crafted design and colorful 
prints to deliver important information to investors about the value of the firm. Thus, it is 
possible to reveal some systematic patterns in financial reports to predict higher subsequent 
returns comparing to peers, which are those firms that don’t use these well-formatted graphic 
annual reports or simply use pure plain 10-Ks. We split our hand collected sample dataset into 
three categories: the firms who do not change their reporting format, the firms who add fancy-
look print annual report to pure plain 10-Ks, and the firms who remove fancy-look print annual 
report to pure plain 10-Ks. We, then, examine their abnormal performance around their report-
release dates (annual earnings announcement dates). On average, there is no short term abnormal 
                                                             
2 Other related studies include Carrillo (2008) and Benefield and Cain (2009), which analyze the effects on housing 
markets transactions of the number of interior and exterior pictures used in the house sale advertisement. However, 
their studies focus on the real estate markets rather than the traditional finance fields.  
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performance for any group of firms that we study, which implies that investors have not fully 
reveal the information in the print financial reports. However, the firms who change their 
reporting format from pure 10-Ks to graphic annual reports gain positive abnormal returns, 
roughly 3%, at an intermediate horizon of three to six months. This finding is robust to different 
abnormal returns measures such as CAPM alphas, Fama-French 3 factor alphas, Fama-French-
Carhart four factor alphas, and Fama-French five factor alphas.  
We, then, match the firms who added the prints with their industry peers who didn’t 
change their reporting format, and re-do the previous tests. The documented results still hold. We 
also consider whether there are other reasons that drive the positive future performance. We use 
institutional ownership, short interests, and analyst coverage before adding the colorful prints to 
proxy investor sophistication, market constraints, and information asymmetry. Although firms 
with less sophisticated investors, that are more short-sale constrained, and with higher degree of 
information asymmetry show slightly stronger pattern of the documented positive future stock 
performance, these possible reasons cannot fully explain our finding. The interesting findings in 
this paper show that the information embedded in the print annual reports takes one to two 
quarters to be finally revealed in the secondary market.  
To further confirm that the new graphic reports contain new additional soft information, 
we conduct a short term event study around the earnings announcement day. Liberti and Petersen 
(2018) characterize hard information and soft information. Hard information is easy to measure 
and stone, and generally quantitative such as financial statements. From the event study, we fail 
to find any significant event CARs nor post-announcement drifts. Our results suggest that the 
newly added graphic reports contain new additional information rather than “hardening” the 
existing information.   
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Lastly, we attempt to study the possible sources of this wealthy effects. Employing 
Differences-in-Differences approach with the matched sample we find that firms who change 
their reporting format experience a statistically significant increase in their corporate investment, 
suggesting that firms might use the nicely drafted financial media to signal the corporation 
fundamentals.  
One of our contributions is that we fill in the blank of analyzing an important source and 
channel of financial information. We find that corporate insiders use print financial reports to 
deliver extra signals to market in addition to the standard numbers. Second, we quantify the 
wealthy effects of public firms’ communication with shareholders when using multimedia. And 
last but not least, the documented finding in stock returns serves a new anomaly to the secondary 
market. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews the related 
literature and develops our research methods; section 3 describes data and sample characteristics; 
section 4 reports our empirical results; section 5 concludes finally. 
   
2. Related Literature and Research Methods  
Our research design relies on the approaches used in Psychology, Linguistics, Finance, and 
other sociology. As we know, content analysis does not origin from finance research. Most of 
content analysis has been conducted by scholars and researchers in the areas of linguistics, 
psychology, and sociology. In the fields we mentioned above, the content analysis is named 
discourse analysis. The major analytical tools for discourse analysis are the systemic functional 
(SF) approach and the multimodal social semiotic approach, which indicated the theory of 
analyzing the meaning from the use of multiple semiotic resources in discourses, ranging from 
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written, digital, audio, video, and texts to gestures and materials in real life. The SF approach is 
mainly adopted to analyze the verbal, while the multimodal social semiotic approach is to 
capture different modalities, such as audio and visual texts. As is proposed by Wohlwend (2011), 
“critical multimodal analysis unpacks modes to reveal how modal interaction maps onto 
discursively maintained power relations” (p. 262). The analysis mentioned above reveals how 
meaning was constructed in coherence and complementarity across linguistic, audio and visual 
elements. 
As the most influential figure in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), Halliday (1994) 
proposes three meta-functions, namely ideational function, interpersonal function and textual 
function. The ideational meaning of the text generally refers to the field knowledge, in which the 
states of affairs are represented. The interpersonal meaning deals with the social relations, which 
enables a way of valuing and assessing these activities and enacting power in relation to shared 
values. Meanwhile, the textual meaning function manages the information flow that organizes 
the ideational and interpersonal meaning into textures, which are responsive to the 
communicative demands of oral and written discourse.  
The interpersonal and textual meaning is originally to be viewed for interpreting the 
traditional mode of writing. Nowadays, both written, visual components and other semiotics are 
considered to be crucial tools in our society for the construction of the meaning (Ventola & 
Guijarro 2009). During the last decade, the increasing interest across multiple disciplines 
generates the trend for an exploration to the multimodality within a range of domain, such as the 
advertising, picture books, music, etc. (Feng, 2011; Wignell, 2011). 
Textual analysis is the study on qualitative information of financial media. This analysis is 
confronted by the difficult process of accurately converting qualitative information into 
7 
 
quantitative measures.  
There are various methods to measure the qualitative information (i.e. words, tone, and 
graphic information) such as Naive Bayes classifications, likelihood ratios, or other classification 
algorithms. Li (2010) discusses the benefits of using a statistical approach over a word 
categorization one, arguing that categorization might have low power for corporate filings 
because “there is no readily available dictionary that is built for the setting of corporate filings”. 
Tetlock (2007) discusses the limitations of the estimation of likelihood ratios based on difficulty 
to replicate and subjective classification of texts’ tone. The commonly used tool to evaluate the 
tone of a text is Harvard’s General Inquirer. However, Loughran and McDonald (2011) argue 
that the results Harvard dictionary provides are not accurate. Be specifically, they find many 
words in negative words list of Harvard dictionary are not actually negative under many financial 
contexts. Alternatively, Loughran and McDonald provide another negative word list, along with 
five other word lists, which better reflect tone in financial text.  
There have been already a bunch of empirical studies providing much evidence about 
interaction between the financial text and many financial phenomena. Li (2008) finds that the 
financial reports of the firms with lower earnings are harder to read, and the financial reports of 
the firms with persistent positive earnings are easier to read. By using word content analysis, 
Hanley and Hoberg (2009) decompose information in the initial public offering prospectus into 
its standard and informative components. They find that greater informative content, as a proxy 
for premarket due diligence, results in more accurate offer prices and less underpricing. There 
also have some findings on mergers and acquisitions. By using text based analysis of 10-K 
product descriptions, Hoberg and Philips (2010) find that the transactions are more likely 
between firms that use similar product market language, and the related stock returns, ex-post 
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cash flows all increase as well. More recently, Twedt and Rees (2012) analyze the financial 
analysts’ reports details and reports tone, finding that the tone of financial analyst reports 
contains significant information content incremental to the reports’ earnings forecasts and 
recommendations, and report complexity (one component of report detail) helps explain cross-
sectional variation in the market’s response to the reports’ recommendations. 
Analyzing the content of graph in printed media is also an important component of content 
analysis. However, there are much fewer studies on this aspect in finance. Currently, most of 
these kinds of studies exist in the area of real estate.  
By using instrumental variables, Carrillo (2008) find that visual contents have a large and 
positive effect on marketing outcomes. For instance, adding a virtual tour may increase the 
expected transaction price by about 2 percent and decrease the expected time on the market by 
about 20 percent.  
Similarly, Benefield and Cain (2009) use the number of interior and exterior photos as the 
measure of information content, and find that additional photographs increase price, while 
simultaneously lengthening property marketing duration.  
In this study, we extend the methods used in textual analysis and study the graphic 
information embedded in companies’ financial reports. To identify the graphic information in 
financial reports we hand collect the firms which experience reporting format changes such as 
adding the nicely drafted colorful annual reports to the standard 10-Ks. In the following section, 
we discuss our hand collected sample and data sources.  
 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1. Hand Collected Sample 
9 
 
We hand collected 758 firms from SP1500 index from 2007 fiscal year to 2012 fiscal year. We 
have requested print version from the public listed firms. All the firms we have requested were 
able to send us the print version annual reports. And those firms print version annual reports 
looks the same as the pdf version found on their websites under “investor relationship” section.  
After obtaining the financial reports, we split our hand collected sample dataset into three 
categories: the firms who do not change their reporting format, the firms who add nicely drafted 
colorful print annual report to pure plain 10-Ks, and the firms who remove the colorful print 
annual report to pure plain 10-Ks. Then, we look for whether the firms adding colorful print 
annual report to pure plain 10-Ks experience any subsequent abnormal superior performance. 
Table 1 reports the summary of our hand collected sample. There are many interesting features in 
this sample. On average, there are still more than 70% of firms using colorful financial reports to 
deliver their annual financial information, and some firms have strong preference to use this kind 
of reporting (e.g. the maximum number of colorful pages in companies’ annual reports is 83). 
And the management don’t change their reporting format frequently. There are about 6% of firms 
adding or removing the colorful print version annual reports.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Returns and Control Variables 
We obtain the monthly returns and market returns from CRSP for the period of 2007_2013. 
In order to calculate abnormal returns, we download Fama-French Three Factors (FF3), Fama-
French-Carhart Four Factors (FF3 plus up and down factor), and Fama-French Five Factors (FF5) 
from Fama-French factors database.  
We obtain the annual firm level accounting variables and short interests data from 
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Compustat, institutional holdings data from Thomson’s CDA/Spectrum database (form 13F), 
analyst coverage data from Institutional Brokers Estimate Systems (I/B/E/S), and readability fog 
index from SEC Analytic database.  
  
4. Empirical Results  
4.1. Firm Characteristics 
 To check if the companies who added graphic financial report (basically easily read 
version for generic readers) are fundamentally different from their peers, we matched a group of 
control firms based on total assets, industry, and readability with the firms in the treatment group, 
which are firms that experience newly added graphic financial reports in addition to their 
standard 10-K required by SEC. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the firm characteristics 
for both groups before reporting format changes on their websites. We compare Total Assets, 
ROA, ROE, Sales Growth, Asset Growth, CAPX, CAPX&RD, Leverage, Readability, and the 
“Test for Differences” clearly shows that the two groups are statistically indifferent from each 
other.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 In Table 3, we then run logit model to test the relationship between Firm Characteristics 
and the Addition of Prints, and we report the results in Table 5. In the single factor regression, the 
readability index has a coefficient of 0.048 with t-stat of 1.71, and the same coefficient in the 
multivariate regression is 0.107 with a t-stat of 2.19, which means that firms are 10.7 % more 
likely to add graphic financial report when readability index increase by one.  Clearly it shows 
that the firms with financial reports of higher readability are more likely to add graphic financial 
reports. And firms engaged in more accrual management are less likely to add graphic financial 
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reports. These results are consistent with Li (2008, 2010), which indicates that firms further use 
graphic financial reports to deliver information in addition to employ more readable financial 
report text.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2. Stock Performance Subsequent to the Reporting Format Changes 
Table 4 reports the results of abnormal returns around annual earnings announcement 
dates.  We include the standard CAPM model, Fama-French three-factor model (FF3), the Four 
factor model (FF3 factors and the Up minus Down factor), and Fama-French five-factor model 
(FF5). We estimate the regression within the event windows of -3 months before, and 3 months, 
6 months, 9 months, and 12 months after the format changes. The first four columns report the 
abnormal returns for firms that change standard 10-Ks to beautifully-designed annual reports, 
and the last four columns report the abnormal returns for firms that do the opposite changes in 
their financial report format. It is clear that the extra information carried with the graphic annual 
reports is on average positive because the abnormal returns from the four models are 0.027(p-
value = 0.00) 0.047 (p-value = 0.01), 0.025 (p-value = 0.00) and 0.018 (p-value = 0.06) for 4-
Factor model, Fama-French 3-factor model, Fama-French 5-factor model, and CAPM model 
respectively in the 6 months after the earnings announcement. And such a significant positive 
abnormal returns are not observed in the 3 months window. After 6 months, the abnormal returns 
drop slightly (but not significant in an untabulated t-test), but the reversal is quite limited, which 
indicates that it is not market short-term response to the fancy design of the financial report, but 
the insiders try to deliver information through an additional channel. On the other hand, when 
companies decide to the opposite, stopping doing the graphically designed annual reports, there 
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is negative but insignificant market response. The 6 months window abnormal returns are -0.01 
(p-value = 0.52), -0.01 (p-value = 0.31), -0.01 (p-value=0.52), and -0.001 (p-value = 0.88) for 4-
factor model, Fama-French 3-factor model, Fama-French 5-factor model, and CAPM model 
respectively. There is no significance for other windows as well. Figure 1 illustrates this 
documented pattern in stock returns around the earnings announcements using daily returns. At 
least, this shows that there was no additional positive information carried with the usually “cost 
saving” excuses to stop delivering the graphically designed financial reports. Actually, for almost 
all of the companies in our sample, the cost of adding the graphic fancy looking annual reports 
can always be ignored in the earnings numbers.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
4.3. Robustness 
4.3.1. Matched Sample  
To verify the documented return pattern subsequent to the reporting format change, we 
conduct various robustness tests. To deal with any selection bias, we re-do the same tests in Table 
4 but use a different benchmark. Instead of comparing firms changing their reporting format 
from plain 10-Ks to graphic annual reports and firms reverting back to plain 10-Ks, we study the 
same first group of firms and their industry peers with similar size and financial report 
readability. We report the results in Table 5, in which we don’t observe any significance for the 
matched peers. This confirms the results found in Table 4.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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4.3.2. Investor Sophistication  
One might be curious if this anomaly has been studied yet? With the development of 
information technologies, the computers are more and more powerful. Recently text mining 
trading strategies has been become possible with the recent findings of informational contents 
buried in the text and voice, such as financial report, IPO prospectus, and earnings calls (e.g. 
Loughran & McDonald (2011, 2013, 2015), Engelberg & Parsons (2011), Jegadeesh & Wu 
(2013)). As far as we know, there has no previous academic literature systematically studied the 
information content embedded in the graphically designed financial reports. How about industry? 
Literature in general agrees that institutional investors have more resources and are more 
sophisticated. Have they already figured out the information in the prints? To answer the 
question, we split our sample based on the institutional holdings. Table 6 reports the abnormal 
returns around annual earnings announcement dates grouped by institutional ownership. The first 
four columns report the abnormal returns for firms that change standard 10-Ks to beautifully-
designed annual reports for the firms with high institutional ownership, and the next four 
columns report the abnormal returns for the firms with low institutional ownership for the same 
time periods. Most of the numbers are positive and close to each other between the two groups. 
E.g. the 6 months abnormal returns for the high institutional ownership group are 0.020 (p-value 
=0.06), 0.023 (p-value = 0.06), 0.034 (p-value = 0.06), and 0.029 (p-value= 0.00) respectively 
for CAPM, FF-3 factors model, 4-factor model, and FF-5 factors model, and the 6 months 
abnormal returns for the low institutional ownership group are 0.020 (p-value = 0.08), 0.037 (p-
value = 0.06), 0.064 (p-value = 0.02), and 0.051 (p-value =0.00) for the CAPM, FF-3 factors 
model, 4 factor model, and FF-5 factors model respectively. And the numbers are not statistically 
different between the groups, which indicates that investor sophistication is not a plausible 
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channel for the positive relationship between reporting format change and subsequent stock 
returns.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4.3.3. Information Asymmetry  
Our results in the previous subsection indicate that the positive future stock performance 
doesn’t disappear after controlling institutional ownership. Can information asymmetry explain 
this interesting return pattern? Extant literature has suggested that companies’ stocks with higher 
analyst coverage can be more efficient. The documented relationship between annual report 
“graphicity” and subsequent stock returns may disappear if information asymmetry is the driver 
of this relationship. To do so we split our sample based on the analyst coverage. Table 7 reports 
the abnormal returns around annual earnings announcement dates grouped by analyst coverage. 
The first four columns report the abnormal returns for firms that change standard 10-Ks to 
beautifully-designed annual reports for the firms with high analyst coverage, and the next four 
columns report the abnormal returns for the firms with low analyst coverage for the same time 
periods. Again, most of the numbers are positive and close to each other between the two groups. 
E.g. the 6 months abnormal returns for the high analyst coverage group are 0.019 (p-value =0.06), 
0.021 (p-value = 0.04), 0.024 (p-value = 0.05), and 0.025 (p-value= 0.00) respectively for CAPM, 
FF-3 factors model, 4-factor model, and FF-5 factors model, and the 6 months abnormal returns 
for the low analyst coverage group are 0.021 (p-value = 0.08), 0.038 (p-value = 0.04), 0.068 (p-
value = 0.02), and 0.055 (p-value =0.01) for the CAPM, FF-3 factors model, 4 factor model, and 
FF-5 factors model respectively. And these numbers are not statistically different between the 
groups, which indicates that the information asymmetry is not a sound explanation for the 
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positive subsequent returns.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.3.4. Stock Market Constraints 
 Stock market constraints such as short selling constraints affects market efficiency (see 
e.g. Diamond & Verrecchia (1987), Bris et al. (2007), Boehmer and Wu (2013), and etc.). If short 
selling constraints is a plausible channel to explain the documented relationship in this study, the 
positive relationship between annual report format change and subsequent stock returns is 
expected to be more pronounced for more constrained firms and to be negligible for heavily-
shorted firms. To test this conjecture, we split our sample based on the annual average short 
interests the fiscal year before the earnings announcement. Table 8 reports the abnormal returns 
around annual earnings announcement dates grouped by short interests. The first four columns 
report the abnormal returns for firms that change standard 10-Ks to beautifully-designed annual 
reports for the firms with high short interests, and the next four columns report the abnormal 
returns for the firms with low short interests for the same time periods. Again, most of the 
numbers are positive and close to each other between the two groups. E.g. the 6 months 
abnormal returns for the high short interests group are 0.028 (p-value =0.07), 0.038 (p-value = 
0.06), 0.033 (p-value = 0.05), and 0.035 (p-value= 0.00) respectively for CAPM, FF-3 factors 
model, 4-factor model, and FF-5 factors model, and the 6 months abnormal returns for the low 
analyst coverage group are 0.020 (p-value = 0.08), 0.057 (p-value = 0.04), 0.034 (p-value = 0.02), 
and 0.031 (p-value =0.00) for the CAPM, FF-3 factors model, 4 factor model, and FF-5 factors 
model respectively. And these numbers are not statistically different between the groups, which 
indicates that the short selling constraints cannot explain the positive subsequent returns.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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Given the results above, many alternative explanations don’t seem interpret the positive 
subsequent returns. It suggests that the information content embedded in the graphic financial 
reports have not been revealed by the market yet.  
 
4.4. Hardening Existing Information or Delivering Additional Soft Information? 
 Liberti and Petersen (2018) characterize hard information and soft information. Hard 
information is easy to measure and stone, and generally quantitative such as financial statements. 
Usually, firms use numbers contained in financial statements to signal the financial market. As 
the design of annual report that we study is part of the financial statements, a natural question to 
ask would be “Are companies who add graphic elements to their annual reports trying to ‘harden’ 
the numeric information in the reports or just deliver additional soft information?”.  
 To answer this question, we study the short term stock prices variations around the 
earnings announcements for the firms who added the graphic information to their annual 
financial statements. We compute the market adjusted abnormal returns for the firms who add the 
graphic information, and conduct an event study around the release date of the new graphic 
financial report (e.g., the earnings announcement date). Table 9 reports the results. The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for event windows of [-1,1], [0,1], and [-1,0] are all 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that investors don’t react to this reporting format change. 
The insignificant CARs of post event windows indicate that there are no post earnings 
announcement drifts, consistent with our conjecture that the market fail to identify this additional 
information until several months after the earnings announcement day.  
 In general, the results don’t support the “signaling” explanation, and suggest that the 
newly added graphic reports are actually new additional information to the standard 10-Ks.   
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[Inset Table 9 about here] 
 
4.5. Is This Soft Information Creditable?   
 So far, we have identified a possible information channel through which the insiders try 
to deliver information to the market. Is this information creditable? Do firms really invest on 
greater investment opportunities? We study the matched sample and employ the DiD method to 
test the real activities afterwards. Table 10 reports multivariate DiD results on firm performance 
and corporate investments around reporting format changes. The coefficients of Treatment 
explain the main effect of the reporting format change. Column (1) reports the results of ROA as 
the dependent variable with control variables and without controlling industry and year fixed 
effects. Column (2) reports the results of CAPX as the dependent variable with control variables.  
Column (3) reports the results of PPE as the dependent variable with control. We can find that 
even though the ROA seems not be different between the treatment and control group. However, 
the CAPX and PPE increased significant, with CAPX increases 2.406% (tstat = 1.67) on average, 
and PPE increases by 13.09% (tstat=1.68) on average. And the increase is survived with the 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects as shown in columns (5) and (6).  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 We further employ placebo tests to check the robustness, and the results are reported in 
Table 11. When we randomly change the year of adding graphic financial reports, we lost the 
significance in CAPX and PPE as reported in Table 11, which further confirms the results 
reported in Table 10.  
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
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5. Conclusion  
Extant literature on financial reports content analysis focuses on the standard numbers or 
textual information. With the help of computer programming, researchers have identified firm 
valuation and performance relevant information by mining text readability, Fog index, and 
sentiment. However, maybe because of lack of capability of analyzing non-textual information in 
financial reports, prior literature neglects the existence of the financial reports’ overall design 
and graphics information. On the one hand, all reported numbers and other statements in 
financial reports are digitalized in the information era. On the other hand, it is hard to understand 
why there are a high fraction of firms still providing print version graphic financial reports. 
Managers might have tried to use the additional contents to deliver extra information. However, 
due to computers are still lack of the capability to process the non-textual information, it is very 
likely that it takes more time for such embedded information in the reports to be integrated into 
the stock prices. 
 By examining the firms adding graphic print version financial reports in a large hand-
collected dataset, we find that those firms with newly added graphic financial reports earn at 
least a positive 2.7% abnormal returns. And this finding is robust with different specifications. 
Investor sophistication, financial market constraints, and information asymmetry don’t seem to 
be the plausible explanations for this return pattern.  
 To further disentangle whether firms use the graphic information as additional message or 
just strengthening the existing numbers in 10-Ks, we conduct a short term event study. Our 
results suggest that the newly added graphic reports convey new additional information rather 
than “hardening” the existing information.   
In order to pursue the reasons or the tendency why firms choose to add graphic financial 
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report, we match the firms with newly added print financial reports by size, industry, and 
readability, and form a control group. Then, we conduct DiD tests. With the powerful DiD tests, 
we further find that firms increased CAPX and PPE in the next fiscal year or two after they add 
print version financial reports, which implies that these group of firms have real growth that 
brings in superior performance.  
Overall, our study suggests that not only texts but also graphics embedded in the financial 
report contains material information to the public. The underlying drivers and explanations 
behind this newly found anomaly is worth to pursue in the future studies.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables Definition 
After Dummy variable equal to 1 if the fiscal year is after the reporting format 
changes from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual reports and equal to 0 if the 
fiscal year is before the changes 
Asset Growth Total Assets (AT) divided by start-of-year Total Assets minus one x 100 
Accruals Accruals: it is calculated as discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995) 
Analyst Coverage Number of analysts following the company immediately before the earnings 
announcement date 
CAPX Capital expenditures (Compustat CAPX) scaled by end-of-year total assets 
(AT) x 100 
CAPX&RD Capital expenditures (CAPX) plus Research and Development Expenses 
(XRD) scaled by end-of-year total assets (AT) x 100 
CEO Letter Dummy variable equal to 1 if the there is a CEO letter in the graphic annual 
report in the fiscal year, and 0 if else.  
CEO Picture Dummy variable equal to 1 if the there is a picture of the CEO in the graphic 
annual report in the fiscal year, and 0 if else.  
CEO Signature Dummy variable equal to 1 if the there is a CEO signature in the graphic 
annual report in the fiscal year, and 0 if else.  
Change to 10-Ks Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm changes their reporting format from a 
graphic annual report to a pure plain 10-K, and 0 if else.  
Change to Prints Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm changes their reporting format from 
pure plain 10-K to a graphic annual report, and 0 if else.  
Institutional Ownership Institutional ownership in percentage immediately before the earnings 
announcement date 
Leverage Long term debt (DLTT) plus debt in current liabilities (DLC) scaled by the 
sum of long term debt, debt in current liabilities, and total stockholders' equity 
(SEQ) x 100 
Number of Graphic 
Pages 
The number of pages with colorful pages in the graphic annual reports  
PPE Property, plant, and equipment net 
Prints Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms use graphic annual reports in the fiscal 
year, and 0 if else.  
Q Tobin's Q is defined as market value of equity (PRCC x CSHO) plus book 
value of assets minus book value of equity minus deferred taxes (when 
available) (AT-CEQ-TXDB), scaled by book value of total assets (AT). 
Variable is lagged one year 
Readability Fog Readability index  
ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
Sales Growth Sales dividend by the start-of-year sales minus one x 100 
Short Interests Yearly average of short interests / volume immediately before the earnings 
announcement date 
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Appendix 1, cont’d 
Total Assets Firm level total assets (in Millions USD)  
Treatment Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company experiences any format change from 
pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual reports and its fiscal year during the period 
between 1 year and 2 years after this change. The dummy variable is equal to 0 
when the firm years in the control group 2 years before and after their paired firms' 
format changes, and for the firms that add print financial reports pure plain 10-Ks 
before the format changes.    
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Appendix 2: An Example: AIRM 
Air Methods (Ticker: AIRM) changes their reporting format from a pure plain 10-K to a graphic 
annual report style in the fiscal year of 2011. From the following, we show the cover pages of 
their annual reports in 2010 and 2011 FY as well as the daily stock prices around this format 
change. We can observe the significant changes in their reporting format, and how their share 
prices perform after the format change.  
 
The Cover Page of AIRM’s Annual Report for 2010 Fiscal Year 
 
The Cover Page of AIRM’s Annual Report for 2011 Fiscal Year 
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Snapshot from Yahoo Finance: Daily Stock Prices from Feb, 2012-Oct, 2012 with the Annual  
Earnings Announcement Date of April 10, 2012  
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Tables  
Table 1: The Characteristics of Annual Reports/10-Ks 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of all manually collected annual 
reports/10-Ks for all sample firms from S&P 1500. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
 
Variable No. of Firms Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
Prints 758 0.722 1.000 0.449 2.000 0.000 
Number of 
Graphic Pages 758 6.470 4.000 9.293 83.00 0.000 
CEO Letter 758 0.761 1.000 0.427 2.000 0.000 
CEO Signature 758 0.739 1.000 0.442 2.000 0.000 
CEO Picture 758 0.509 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.000 
Change to 10-Ks 758 0.035 0.000 0.183 1.000 0.000 
Change to Prints 758 0.026 0.000 0.159 1.000 0.000 
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Table 2: Firm Characteristics before Reporting Format Changes  
This table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for both two groups in the matched 
sample one fiscal year immediately before the format changes from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic 
annual reports. The first group includes all firms that experience such format changes. The second 
group is formed by matching by total assets, industry, and readability with the firms in the 
treatment group. The t-stats for mean test and chi-sq for median test are also reported. All variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.  All variables have defined in appendix.  
 
  Firms Changing to Prints 
Matched Firms with no 
Format Changes  Test for Differences 
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD Mean            
(t-stats) 
Median           
(chi-sq) 
Total Assets  64 3,050 630.2 8,571 61 5,318 729.9 25,374 -0.67 0.96 
ROA 54 12.63 12.44 9.89 54 11.35 10.56 10.78 0.64 0.44 
ROE 54 23.03 22.08 22.13 54 21.62 20.08 26.10 0.30 0.44 
Sales Growth 54 10.89 14.49 21.25 52 11.25 10.60 25.14 -0.08 0.69 
Asset Growth 54 7.716 5.556 19.10 54 11.60 6.089 28.24 -0.83 0.00 
CAPX 55 4.124 2.801 3.911 56 4.320 2.628 4.508 -0.24 0.44 
CAPX&RD 34 8.639 7.698 6.907 37 9.091 6.48 8.204 -0.25 1.13 
Leverage 54 18.87 5.47 22.33 54 20.20 17.13 22.57 -0.30 0.59 
Readability 36 18.16 17.91 3.238 22 18.02 18.12 2.692 0.17 0.29 
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Table 3: Firm Characteristics and the Addition of Prints 
This table reports the logistic regression results that identify the characteristics of the firms who 
added print financial reports. Columns (1) through (5) report the results of CAPX, Q, Size, and 
Readability-index as the independent variable without controlling other firm characteristics. 
Column (6) reports the results of all above variables as the independent variables with control 
variables. T-statistics are displayed in the parenthesis under each coefficient. Standard errors 
adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
Prints Prints Prints Prints Prints Prints 
       CAPX -0.014 
    
-0.033 
 
(-0.50) 
    
(-0.78) 
       Accurals 
 
-0.310** 
   
-0.469* 
  
(-2.25) 
   
(-1.69) 
       Q 
  
-0.079 
  
-0.113 
   
(-0.74) 
  
(-0.52) 
       Size 
   
0.381*** 
 
0.335* 
    
(3.34) 
 
(1.80) 
       Readability-Index 
    
0.048* 0.107** 
     
(1.71) (2.19) 
       Leverage 
     
-0.004 
      
(-0.34) 
       Past Profitability 
     
0.024 
      
(1.15) 
       N 602 519 600 613 279 196 
pseudo R-sq 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.035 0.003 0.056 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 4: Abnormal Performance around Annual Earning Announcement Dates 
This table reports the abnormal returns for the firms that change their reporting format from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual reports, 
and vice versa. The abnormal returns are estimated using the following two regressions: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 and 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the individual daily stock returns, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is risk free rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return calculated as value weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP. SMBt is the return difference between portfolios of small and big stocks; HMLt is 
the return difference between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks; UMDt is the return difference between portfolios of 
high and low prior-return stocks; 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of robust and weak operating profitability; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is 
the return difference between portfolios of low and high investment stocks. CAPM alpha measures the monthly abnormal return when 
restricting the coefficients of SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt to zero in the first regression. Three-Factor Alpha is the intercept from the 
regression above when UMDt is omitted. Four-factor alpha is the intercept from the first regression above. Five-factor alpha is the 
intercept from the second regression above. We estimate the regression within the event windows of 3 months before, and 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months, and 12 months after the format changes. P-values are reported for each statistic. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Firms that Change 10-Ks to Prints Firms that Change Prints to 10-Ks 
  CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha 
[-3, 0 mo] 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.015 -0.004 -0.003 
p-value 0.75 0.43 0.56 0.77 0.97 0.80 0.72 0.65 
[0, 3 mo]  0.007 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 0.001 0.009 0.010 0.010 
p-value 0.45 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.95 0.78 0.74 0.75 
[0, 6 mo]  0.018* 0.047*** 0.027*** 0.025*** -0.001 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
p-value 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.31 0.52 0.54 
[0, 9 mo]  0.013* 0.025** 0.019** 0.018** -0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
p-value 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.84 0.24 0.28 0.32 
[0, 12 mo]  0.014 0.025** 0.020** 0.020** 0.000 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 
p-value 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.97 0.21 0.32 0.37 
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Table 5: Abnormal Performance around Annual Earning Announcement Dates: Matched Sample 
This table reports the abnormal returns for the firms that change their reporting format from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual reports, 
and vice versa. The abnormal returns are estimated using the following two regressions: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 and 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the individual daily stock returns, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is risk free rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return calculated as value weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP. SMBt is the return difference between portfolios of small and big stocks; HMLt is 
the return difference between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks; UMDt is the return difference between portfolios of 
high and low prior-return stocks; 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of robust and weak operating profitability; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is 
the return difference between portfolios of low and high investment stocks. CAPM alpha measures the monthly abnormal return when 
restricting the coefficients of SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt to zero in the first regression. Three-Factor Alpha is the intercept from the 
regression above when UMDt is omitted. Four-factor alpha is the intercept from the first regression above. Five-factor alpha is the 
intercept from the second regression above. We estimate the regression within the event windows of 3 months before, and 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months, and 12 months after the format changes. P-values are reported for each statistic. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Firms that Change 10-Ks to Prints Matched Firms with no Format Changes 
  CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha 
[-3, 0 mo] 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.016 -0.004 -0.006 
p-value 0.75 0.43 0.56 0.77 0.95 0.80 0.70 0.71 
[0, 3 mo]  0.007 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 0.001 0.009 0.012 0.012 
p-value 0.45 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.94 0.78 0.77 0.68 
[0, 6 mo]  0.018* 0.047*** 0.027*** 0.025*** -0.002 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 
p-value 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.37 0.58 0.52 
[0, 9 mo]  0.013* 0.025** 0.019** 0.018** -0.001 -0.01 -0.012 -0.013 
p-value 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.74 0.25 0.28 0.32 
[0, 12 mo]  0.014 0.025** 0.020** 0.020** 0.002 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014 
p-value 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.95 0.41 0.39 0.41 
 
 
31 
 
Table 6: Abnormal Performance around Annual Earning Announcement Dates, Grouped by Institutional Ownership  
This table reports the mean abnormal returns for the firms that change their reporting format from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual 
reports grouped by institutional ownership before the format changes. The abnormal returns are estimated using the following two 
regressions: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 and 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the individual daily stock returns, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is risk free rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return calculated as value weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP. SMBt is the return difference between portfolios of small and big stocks; HMLt is 
the return difference between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks; UMDt is the return difference between portfolios of 
high and low prior-return stocks; 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of robust and weak operating profitability; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is 
the return difference between portfolios of low and high investment stocks. CAPM alpha measures the monthly abnormal return when 
restricting the coefficients of SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt to zero in the first regression. Three-Factor Alpha is the intercept from the 
regression above when UMDt is omitted. Four-factor alpha is the intercept from the first regression above. Five-factor alpha is the 
intercept from the second regression above. We estimate the regression within the event windows of 3 months before, and 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months, and 12 months after the format changes. P-values are reported for each statistic. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Firms with Higher Institutional Ownership Firms with Lower Institutional Ownership 
  CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha 
[-3, 0 mo] 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.016 -0.004 -0.006 
p-value 0.70 0.41 0.32 0.83 0.95 0.80 0.70 0.71 
[0, 3 mo]  0.028* -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 0.031 -0.023 -0.023 0.011 
p-value 0.06 0.67 0.67 0.35 0.21 0.61 0.61 0.70 
[0, 6 mo]  0.020* 0.023* 0.034* 0.029*** 0.020* 0.037* 0.064** 0.051*** 
p-value 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 
[0, 9 mo]  0.015 0.016* 0.018* 0.017** 0.015 0.027* 0.035* 0.030** 
p-value 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.41 0.09 0.08 0.04 
[0, 12 mo]  0.017* 0.017* 0.018 0.020** 0.016 0.026* 0.035* 0.030** 
p-value 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.37 0.09 0.07 0.03 
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Table 7: Abnormal Performance around Annual Earning Announcement Dates, Grouped by Analyst Coverage 
This table reports the mean abnormal returns for the firms that change their reporting format from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual 
reports grouped by analyst coverage before the format changes. The abnormal returns are estimated using the following two 
regressions: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 and 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the individual daily stock returns, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is risk free rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return calculated as value weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP. SMBt is the return difference between portfolios of small and big stocks; HMLt is 
the return difference between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks; UMDt is the return difference between portfolios of 
high and low prior-return stocks; 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of robust and weak operating profitability; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is 
the return difference between portfolios of low and high investment stocks. CAPM alpha measures the monthly abnormal return when 
restricting the coefficients of SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt to zero in the first regression. Three-Factor Alpha is the intercept from the 
regression above when UMDt is omitted. Four-factor alpha is the intercept from the first regression above. Five-factor alpha is the 
intercept from the second regression above. We estimate the regression within the event windows of 3 months before, and 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months, and 12 months after the format changes. P-values are reported for each statistic. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Firms with Higher Analyst Coverage Firms with Lower Analyst Coverage 
  CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha 
[-3, 0 mo] 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 
p-value 0.52 0.35 0.49 0.81 0.95 0.80 0.70 0.71 
[0, 3 mo]  0.023* -0.022 -0.013 -0.022 0.032 -0.019 -0.013 0.003 
p-value 0.06 0.67 0.67 0.35 0.21 0.58 0.45 0.87 
[0, 6 mo]  0.019* 0.021** 0.024** 0.025*** 0.021* 0.038** 0.068** 0.055*** 
p-value 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 
[0, 9 mo]  0.015* 0.013* 0.017* 0.015** 0.019 0.029* 0.032* 0.041** 
p-value 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.41 0.08 0.09 0.02 
[0, 12 mo]  0.017* 0.018 0.016 0.019 0.019* 0.036* 0.035* 0.031** 
p-value 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.04 
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Table 8: Abnormal Performance around Annual Earning Announcement Dates, Grouped by Short Interests 
This table reports the mean abnormal returns for the firms that change their reporting format from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual 
reports grouped by short interests before the format changes. The abnormal returns are estimated using the following two regressions: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 and 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the individual daily stock returns, 𝑟𝑓𝑡 is risk free rate, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the market return calculated as value weighted return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP. SMBt is the return difference between portfolios of small and big stocks; HMLt is 
the return difference between portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks; UMDt is the return difference between portfolios of 
high and low prior-return stocks; 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the return difference between portfolios of robust and weak operating profitability; 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is 
the return difference between portfolios of low and high investment stocks. CAPM alpha measures the monthly abnormal return when 
restricting the coefficients of SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt to zero in the first regression. Three-Factor Alpha is the intercept from the 
regression above when UMDt is omitted. Four-factor alpha is the intercept from the first regression above. Five-factor alpha is the 
intercept from the second regression above. We estimate the regression within the event windows of 3 months before, and 3 months, 6 
months, 9 months, and 12 months after the format changes. P-values are reported for each statistic. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Firms with Higher Short Interests Firms with Lower Short Interests 
  CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha CAPM 3 Factor Alpha 4 Factor Alpha 5 Factor Alpha 
[-3, 0 mo] 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 
p-value 0.45 0.25 0.36 0.75 0.55 0.48 0.35 0.57 
[0, 3 mo]  0.028* -0.023 -0.023 -0.021 0.031 -0.023 -0.023 0.011 
p-value 0.07 0.72 0.57 0.35 0.21 0.61 0.61 0.70 
[0, 6 mo]  0.028* 0.038* 0.033** 0.035*** 0.020* 0.057** 0.034** 0.031*** 
p-value 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 
[0, 9 mo]  0.015 0.016* 0.018* 0.017** 0.017* 0.019** 0.025** 0.029** 
p-value 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 
[0, 12 mo]  0.016 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.020* 0.024** 0.025** 
p-value 0.09 0.22 0.19 0.30 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.03 
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Table 9: Multivariate DiD Results: Firm Performance and Corporate Investments around 
Reporting Format Changes 
This table reports the mean abnormal returns for the firms that change their reporting format 
from pure plain 10-Ks to graphic annual reports grouped. We compute the abnormal returns 
using market model, within the event windows of 1 day before to 1 day after, 1 day after to 10 
days after, and to 30 days after the format changes. P-values are reported for each statistic. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  [-1, 0] [0, 1] [-1, 1] [1, 10] [1, 30] 
CAR 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.008 -0.008 
P-value 0.45 0.34 0.48 0.49 0.48 
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Table 10: Multivariate DiD Results: Firm Performance and Corporate Investments around 
Reporting Format Changes 
This table reports the regression results that estimate differences in treated and their paired firms’ 
firm performance and corporate investment around the reporting format changes. Column (1) 
reports the results of ROA as the dependent variable with control variables and without 
controlling industry and year fixed effects. Column (2) reports the results of CAPX as the 
dependent variable with control variables and without controlling industry and year fixed effects.  
Column (3) reports the results of PPE as the dependent variable with control variables and 
without controlling industry and year fixed effects. Column (4) reports the results of ROA as the 
dependent variable with control variables and controlling industry and year fixed effects. Column 
(5) reports the results of CAPX as the dependent variable with control variables and controlling 
industry and year fixed effects.  Column (6) reports the results of PPE as the dependent variable 
with control variables and controlling industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are displayed in 
the parenthesis under each coefficient. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
  ROA CAPX PPE ROA CAPX PPE 
       After 2.076 -0.911 -7.617 3.013 0.223 -0.419    
 
(1.54) (-0.73) (-1.19) (1.01) (0.12) (-0.05)    
       Treatment -1.129 2.406* 13.09* -0.789 1.941* 5.529*    
 
(-0.87) (1.67) (1.68) (-0.30) (1.69) (1.67)    
       Size 0.279 -0.227 -0.823 0.861 -0.333 -4.839**  
 
(0.49) (-0.63) (-0.25) (0.71) (-0.73) (-2.17)    
       Leverage 0.020 0.038* 0.592*** 0.008 0.014 0.331**  
 
(0.63) (1.95) (3.44) (0.12) (0.43) (2.11)    
       Readability-Index -0.524* -0.025 0.687 -0.682** -0.043 0.655    
 
(-1.76) (-0.24) (0.70) (-2.36) (-0.55) (1.09)    
       Past Profitability 0.756*** 0.161*** 0.782*** 0.552*** 0.113*** 0.242    
 
(6.82) (5.06) (3.76) (3.75) (3.19) (1.27)    
       Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 160 160 157 160 160 157    
adj. R-sq 0.548 0.134 0.193 0.627 0.455 0.695    
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Table 11: Placebo Tests 
This table reports Placebo tests results when we define the event year as “Pseudo Event” year. 
Panel A reports the placebo tests results when we use the third year before the format change as 
the “Pseudo Event” year for all firms. Panel B reports the placebo tests results when we use the 
third year after the format change as the “Pseudo Event” year for all firms. Columns 1 and 2 
report the results of dependent variables as CAPX and PPE without controlling year and industry 
fixed effects; Columns 3 and 4 report the results of dependent variables as CAPX and PPE with 
controlling year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are displayed within parentheses under 
each coefficient. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by 
firm. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 
  CAPX PPE CAPX PPE 
Panel A: Year of Format Changes=-3     
Treatment -1.604 10.69 0.490 0.001    
 
(-0.46) (0.83) (0.19) (0.00) 
     with Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Panel B: Year of Format Changes=+3     
Treatment 0.929 -2.482 1.540 -3.746 
 
(0.63) (-0.22) (1.28) (-0.50) 
     with Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year/Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Abnormal Returns around the Reporting Format Changes 
This figure depicts mean market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns, for firms who change their 
reporting format (adding graphic reports) from 10 days before to 90 days after the format changes.  
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